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Trade Association Offering Legal Services-
A Possibility For Small Corporations
Robert R. Hussey*
W ITH THE EVER INCREASING NUMBER and complexity of legal prob-
lems which result from operating a small corporation today,
the involvement of attorneys in these small companies is continually
growing. In many sectors of the economic arena a group of small busi-
nesses rather than one large corporation, may dominate an industry.
Due to the greater need for legal work, the cost to the corporation for
this work is correspondingly increasing in spite of their efforts to use
attorneys well versed in their particular field of endeavor. In order to
minimize this cost the giant corporations may hire attorneys on a
salary basis to serve them, but the small corporation usually does not
have the volume of work to justify such an arrangement.
Small corporations generally belong to a trade association which
allows them to increase their proficiency in and knowledge of their in-
dustry. As a possible solution to the problem of increasing legal serv-
ice requirements this paper investigates the suitability of allowing these
trade associations to provide legal services to member corporations.
With this technique there would, of course, be certain obvious ad-
vantages to the corporation. Each could be sure that an association
attorney possesses legal expertise particular to their industry. He would
be familiar with their methods of manufacture, product lines and other
industry problems. This would undoubtedly decrease the cost of his
services when handling product liability suits, labor relations, con-
tracts, corporate security transactions, corporate sale and acquisition,
and other advice and opinions to members. However, there are some
areas where there could be a conflict of interest. When such a conflict
arises the assumption must be made that the attorney would notify
both member parties of the conflict.1
On the other hand there would be advantages to the attorney. In
general, professional attorneys have their income taxed as ordinary in-
come and have not been able to take certain tax advantages that are
available to corporations. Some states allow attorneys to practice law
as a corporate entity under certain requirements, but their personal
and the corporate assets are not insulated from liability for unethical
acts. 2 In states where a professional corporation is not allowed to prac-
* B.S.M.E., Case Institute of Technology; Engineer, Ashtabula Bow Socket Company,
Ashtabula; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 6.
2 In re Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961), Keogh, Tax Equity for the Self-
Employed, 47 A.B.A.J. 665 (1961).
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tice because of state statute, the Federal Government has allowed mem-
bers of an unincorporated association to practice medicine and be
considered as a corporation for tax purposes. 3 An incorporated trade
association would certainly be able to take advantage of its corporate
status for its salaried attorneys. An added advantage to the attorney is
greater occupational security.
An association has been defined as a combination of two or more
persons, or partnership, acting together for the prosecution of some
business enterprise, with corporate characteristics but in many cases
without a corporate charter. 4 More particularly, a trade association has
been defined as
an agency through which many or all of the sellers of a like com-
modity unite to promote their common interests. It exists solely to
serve its members; it does not itself engage in the production or sale
of goods.5
The right of association is a necessary inference in the First Amend-
ment, to properly protect the express guarantees,' but it is not an abso-
lute right and is subject to particular interests that the State may wish to
protect.7 There is a clear right to associate for the purpose of pro-
moting ideas or views, s or soliciting members,9 and membership in an
association cannot be used as the only criterion for restricting a citizen's
constitutional rights.10 These associational rights have recently been
expanded by the Supreme Court to include the right of a union," or
association, 12 to provide legal services to its individual members. In
probing the question of whether this associational right includes cor-
porate members one must contrast the current liberal trend with judicial
history of denying individual rights to corporations.
Almost all industries have formed trade associations even though
their right to associate has been challenged by the antitrust laws. The
3 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); see also Galt v. United
States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (D. Tex. 1959), in which a Texas Medical Association is tax-
able as a corporation.
4 7 C.J.S. Associations § 19 (1937).
5 Stickells, A., Legal Control of Business Practice, 178 (1965) citing, Competition and
Monopoly in American Industry (TNEC Monograph No. 21). See also, Oleck, Non-
Profit Corporations, Organizations & Associations, § 272 (2d ed., 1965).
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and see, Oleck, op. cit. supra note 5.
7 Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 258 F.Supp. 515 (D. Colo.
1966).
8 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
9 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
10 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Oleck, op. cit. supra note 5 at
§ 195.
11 United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
12 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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legality of an association of "cooperative competitors" becomes ques-
tionable as cooperation increases and competition decreases.1 3 The early
antitrust cases pointed out that where the objective is to control prices,
trade association activities are unlawful, 14 and this rule was soon
broadened to state that the necessary combination inherent in a trade
association is unlawful when the tendency is to destroy proper competi-
tion.15 Even though a trade association is not monopolistic in character,
a change in the market conditions will not be considered an undue re-
straint where it would increase competitive opportunities. 6 In addi-
tion, the price of goods must not be unreasonably low, for the Robinson-
Patman Price Discrimination Act makes it unlawful to sell goods at
unreasonably low prices (including below cost) to eliminate competi-
tion.17 In order to observe these guidelines the trade association legal
fee schedule must be set to cover the attorney's salary and overhead
and show no profit. If there is no price discrimination between mem-
bers of a trade association, and all members of the industry were in-
vited to join, there should be no antitrust problem in providing legal
services to the members of an association.
In order for an attorney to practice law in a particular state, it is
required that he be accepted by the bar of that state and adhere to cer-
tain ethical standards that they have deemed necessary. In general, this
code of behavior is embodied in the American Bar Association's Canons
of Professional Ethics,' 8 a code of conduct which prohibits an attorney
from representing those who have conflicting interests except in cases
where both parties have complete knowledge of the situation and give
express consent.19 Therefore, in a trade association offering legal serv-
ices to its members, a member could give express consent after he had
been fully advised that the particular case in which the attorney was
involved might present a conflict of interest. When both parties in the
case are members of the trade association, the association attorney
should refer each to outside counsel. If the attorney from a trade as-
sociation is acting for one of the parties, and outside counsel representing
the opposite party, he would have to be careful not to communicate with
the opposing party, or have any interest in the case,20 even though
natural relations might exist between him and the opposing party.2 1
13 Stickells, Legal Control of Business Practice 182 (1965).
14 American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
15 United States v. American Linseed Oil Company, 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
16 Sugar Institutes Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
17 United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
18 Drinker, Legal Ethics 22-30, 309-325 (1953).
19 Canons, supra note 1.
20 Id., Canon 9.
21 Id., Canon 10.
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Since the early days of the bar, advertising to solicit clients has
been looked upon with great disdain. To maintain this traditional dig-
nity, to prevent the stirring up of litigation (such as extensive adver-
tising would create),22 and to protect the public from those less able,
these prohibitions against advertising and solicitation have been main-
tained.23 The members of .this honorable profession also require as-
sumption of the responsibility by its members for litigation in accepted
cases. 24 Most certainly the salaried attorney supplied by a trade as-
sociation would find no financial enticement to increase or generate liti-
gation in any fields within the structure of the trade association. His
responsibilities and authority could be clearly defined to comply in both
letter and spirit with Canon 31.
Should a trade association prepare, certify and distribute an ap-
proved law list, instead of hiring the attorney on a salary basis? Since
this could be injurious to the dignity of the profession or damage the
public stature of the profession, there is an ethical question as to whether
an attorney may be so listed.25 If this method of operation were utilized
by a trade association there would also be the strong possibility that an
attorney might be tempted to stir up litigation.
The attorney-client relationship is one that requires trust, confidence,
undivided allegiance, faithfulness, "disinterest" in the action, integrity,
and absence of any personal advantage for the attorney 2 6-and is in
fact fiduciary in nature.27 In order to clarify this relationship, Canon
35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics was adopted.28 This canon
specifically allows an attorney to be employed by a trade association,
but indicates that he should not offer legal services to the members "in
respect to their individual affairs." 29 This canon strikes at the heart
of the matter that we are considering. Although it does not prohibit
counsel hired by an association to also work for members of the trade
association, the American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized
Practice in 1950 prohibited corporations from providing retained at-
torneys to perform legal services for the employees of the corporation,
even when there was no conflict of interest between the interest of the
association and member.30 It has been indicated that Canon 35 is not
22 Id., Canon 28.
23 Drinker, supra note 18, at 210-212; Id., Canon 27.
24 Id., Canon 31.
25 Id., Canon 43.
26 State Bar Ass'ns v. Conn. Bank and Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958).
27 7 Am. Jur.2d Ass'ns, § 105 (1963).
28 Canon 35 was adopted at the 51st meeting of the A.B.A. at Seattle, Washington,
on July 26, 1928, and amended Aug. 31, 1933.
29 Canons, supra note 1, Canon 35.
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violated if a small unincorporated group hires an attorney to handle
all of their legal business.3 1
While these canons may be considered to peripherally deal with
the question at hand, the American Bar Association has clarified its
position on this issue in Canon 47.
No lawyer shall permit his services or his name, to be used in aid
of or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by any lay
agency, personal or corporate. 32
The ideals enumerated in the Canons of Professional Ethics have
continually been vigorously advocated by the legal profession. How-
ever, once the idealism is washed away, the practicalities of the issue
before us present themselves in many case law situations.
Under the state police powers each state has the power to regulate
the practice of law 33 by means of rules, state statutes or both.34 This
power resides in the Judicial Department,35 and where the constitution
of a state does not expressly bestow the regulation of the practice of
law in any specific governmental department, "it must be exercised
by the department to which it naturally belongs" (the judicial).36 There-
fore the unlawful practice of law may be legislated against even though
the power to determine disbarment is only up to the court, and such
legislation does not detract from such powers of the court.37 The legis-
lative provisions usually are upheld by the state judiciary.
States have held that, except when acting for oneself, as guardian
for another, or performing non-professional services, one who is not a
member of the bar cannot practice law.3 8 This control over those who
are admitted to the bar is for the protection of the public and not simply
to decrease competition between attorneys.3 9 For example, various state
judiciaries have prohibited one from using a name which denotes au-
thorization, to practice law, 40 have required membership in a state
bar association,4 1 and in some cases graduation from an accredited law
31 Drinker, supra note 18, at 165-167.
32 Canons, supra note 1, Canon 47 (adopted Sept. 20, 1937).
33 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (rehearing denied Oct. 22, 1945).
34 7 Am. Jur.2d Ass'ns, § 48 (1963).
35 Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937); Cuyahoga
Abst. Title & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934).
36 In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265
(1937).
37 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941
(1937); also see, In re Saddler, 35 Okla. 510, 130 P. 906 (1913).
38 7 CJS, Attorney and Client, § 724 (1937).
39 Darby v. Mississippi State Board of Bar Admissions, 185 So.2d 684 (Miss. 1966);
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n. v. Holland, 411 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. App. 1967).
40 The Florida Bar v. Fuentes, 190 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1966) (A notary public may not
use terms such as "Notario Publio," "Consultoria," or "Notaria").
41 Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943) (The Supreme Court
will decide whether they will follow the requirement).
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school,42 for admission to the bar. But it should be noted that due
process does not require that every unethical act be anticipated.
43
These same courts have maintained that a corporation cannot prac-
tice law, even though it may act through attorneys who are themselves
members of the bar,44 under many various lines of reasoning including
the Canons of Ethics. 4 5 Other cases maintain that proper attorney-client
relationship cannot be maintained by a corporation, which is not a
human being but rather an artificial creation.
46 Ohio allows only
natural persons to be admitted to the bar, and until the rules of prac-
tice are changed the admission of a corporation shall not be allowed.
47
The legislature is not competent to enact statutes allowing associations
to practice law. 4s It is rather within the power of the courts to prohibit
corporations and associations from practicing law,
49 and the use of cor-
porate limited liability will not be permitted. An attorney may be em-
ployed by a corporation or association, but he may not include in this
employment legal services for the member's individual affairs.
50 In spite
of this consensus of legal opinion, some trade associations have been set
up by attorneys merely to solicit business for the attorneys.
5 1 At least
three undesirable consequences result when lay organizations are al-
lowed to provide legal services: 1) the harm that could result from
conflicting interests between the client and the organization, 2) a de-
terioration of the attorney-client relationship and 3) the commercializa-
tion of the practice of law.52 In order to analyze the courts' interpreta-
tion of proper conduct for attorneys, let us examine the case of at-
torneys working for a particular lay organization and its members.
In some instances collection agencies have solicited and prosecuted
claims for others by having such claims assigned to them. They then
42 Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966).
43 In re Ruffalo, 370 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1966).
44 Grievance Com. of Bar of Flairfield County v. Dacey, 154 Conn. Ct. 129, 222 A.2d
339 (1966) (appeal dismissed 386 U.S. 683, reh. denied, 387 U.S. 938). And see, Oleck,
op. cit. supra note 5, at § 45.
45 State of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title and Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1
(1961); See Canons 6, 15, 27, 35 & 47.
46 State Bar Ass'n. v. Conn. Bank and Trust Co., supra note 26.
47 State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114 (1962); also see, Cleveland Clinic
v. Sombrio, 6 Ohio Misc. 48, 215 N.E.2d 740 (1966).
48 7 C.J.S., Ass'ns., § 36 (1937).
49 In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); and see, supra
note 44.
50 A.B.A., Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, Informative Opinion No.
A, 1950, 36 A.B.A.J. 677 (1950).
51 Hicks and Katz, Article, 41 Yale L. J. 69, 85 (1931).
52 Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing the
Services of Attorneys, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1334 (1959).
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hire attorneys who prosecute the assigned claims and in this way cir-
cumvent the prohibition against having legal services offered to a mem-
ber of a lay organization by the lay organization.
No matter how one looks at it, this constitutes the rendering of
legal services for others as a regular part of a business carried on
for financial gain. This essential fact cannot be hidden by the sub-
terfuge of an assignment. 53
An attorney may, however, accept a case from a collection agency when
his relations with the agency account are direct and his fees are not sub-
ject to or restricted by the agency.5 4 Correspondingly, the collection
agency is also restricted by the previously noted rule that a corporation
or lay organization cannot practice law.15 As we have noted certain First
Amendment freedoms have created an implied "right to association,"
but collection agencies are not protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments against unauthorized practice charges when they hire or
appoint an attorney to litigate claims assigned to these agencies.50
Credit associations, similar in nature to collection agencies, have
similar restrictions. For example, Rinderhnecht v. Toledo Association of
Credit Men involved a credit men's association that would notify others
of a bankruptcy schedule and send a form for proving their claim. They
would also offer services to present the claims and participate in the
election of a trustee by using a power of attorney duly executed. The
trustee in some cases was a member or officer of the association. For
their services and appearances before the referee in bankruptcy, they
would collect a fee equal to the customary percentage of the amount
collected for the use of the association. It was held that this was not
practice of law, 5 7 but when the credit association controlled the flow of
money and the attorneys, without the creditors having knowledge of the
attorneys or arrangement, it was found to be an unlawful practice of
law. 5 s Therefore, it would seem that a credit association may represent
creditors if each creditor has full knowledge of the arrangement and the
fees remain reasonable and customary.
A bank or trust company is also akin to the trade association in that
its "members" are the public at large. A corporation may hire an at-
53 Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634 (1944); In re Incorporated Consultants,
6 Ohio Misc. 143, 216 N.E.2d 912 (1965); See also, Bay County Bar Ass'n. v. Finance
System, Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (not a licensed attorney).
54 Drinker, supra note 18, at 169.
55 L. Meisel and Co. v. Nat'l. Jewelers' Bd. of Trade, 152 N.Y.S. 913, 916, 90 Misc. 19(1915); In re Shoe Manufacturers Protective Ass'n., 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E.2d 746(1936); State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley Co., Inc., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d
895 (1937); Bay County Bar Ass'n. v. Finance System, Inc., supra note 53.
56 State v. Bonded Collection, Inc., 36 Wis.2d 643, 154 N.W.2d 250 (1967).
57 Rinderknecht v. Toledo Ass'n. of Credit Men, 13 F.Supp. 555 (D. of Ohio 1935).
58 Richmond Ass'n. of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n. of the City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327,
189 S.E. 153 (1937).
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torney on a salary basis to represent it, 9 but a banking corporation may
not use its salaried attorneys to examine titles and make separate charges
to their mortgages,60 or in any other instance where they practice law
for others (even when incident to their business) and receive resulting
fees.0 1 When banks form a State Bank Association, publish a bulletin
giving legal advice to the members and identified the advising attorney,
such attorney is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 2 Banks
are, therefore, prohibited from providing legal services to their customers
even though they have an interest in the transaction.
Title companies have been allowed to perform legal work merely
incident to the performance of their business, 3 but not when excessive
charges are involved,64 nor in filling in legal forms for other lending
institutions, 5 drafting deeds for its customers in which it did not have
an interest (even though it received no separate charge for its services
because it was being indirectly compensated by greater volume of
work) ,' or in any situation where advice and opinions are given to
clients for a fee.0 7
Automobile service associations also present an analogous situation.
These associations offer legal services as a benefit of belonging to the
association. If the association appoints an admitted attorney to perform
the legal work,6s or suggests recommended attorneys in their maga-
zines for direct membership contact having nothing else to do with the
litigation except pay for the services, it is considered to have par-
ticipated in the unauthorized practice of law.0 9 Since automobile serv-
ice associations are dealing with the public, the courts seek to protect
59 Arkansas Bar Ass'n. v. Union Nat'l. Bank of Little Rock, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d
408 (1954); (a bank may employ an attorney to foreclose mortgages owned by the
bank and include proper attorney's fees in the foreclosure charges as long as the
fees do not exceed his salary resulting in a net profit to the bank); also see Swift v.
Board of County Comm'rs. of Hennepin County, 76 Minn. 194, 78 N.W. 1107 (1899).
60 Kentucky State Bar Ass'n. v. First Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n. of Covington,
342 S.W.2d 397 (C.A. Ky. 1961).
61 In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930); Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity
Bank and Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Green v. Huntington Nat'l. Bank,
3 Ohio App.2d 62, 209 N.E.2d 228 (1964), Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n., 135
Col. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957).
62 A.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinions, No. 98 (1957).
63 Detroit Bar Ass'n. v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N.W. 365
(1937).
64 New Jersey State Bar Ass'n. v. Nor. NJ. Mtg. Ass'n., 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257
(1960); Steer v. Land Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 113 N.E.2d
763 (1953).
65 New Jersey State Bar Ass'n. v. Nor. N.J. Mtg. Ass'n., Id.
66 Bar Ass'n. of Dallas v. Hexter Title and Abstract Co., 175 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1943);
affd. 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
67 Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23 (1934).
68 Rhode Island Bar Ass'n. v. Auto. Servs. Ass'n., 55 R.P. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935).
69 In re Maclub of America, 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936).
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the public interest, maintain the confidential and fiduciary attorney-
client relationship that should exist, and to keep the automobile service
associations from acting as intermediaries. But as long as the associa-
tion receives no direct or indirect compensation from the attorneys em-
ployed, and the attorneys are selected by the member, there is no un-
authorized practice of law.70 The lenient trend has been furthered by
the allowance of association members to fill out blank forms and nego-
tiate claims for members of an automobile association as long as they
do not render legal advice to the member.7 1 Thus can be traced the
liberal attitude developing toward associations offering legal services
to its members.
However, the strength of these preceding historical arguments has
been shaken by three recent Supreme Court decisions. The crux of these
decisions has been the authority of the Federal Judiciary over the State
Judiciary's power to regulate admission to the state bar. The ever
growing power of the Federal Judiciary has been a constant thorn in the
side to those who advocate judicial restraint. Thomas Jefferson once
said to Spencer Roane (1821),
The great object of my fear is the Federal Judiciary. That body,
like gravity, ever acting with noiseless foot, and in alarming ad-
vance, gaining ground step by step, and holding what it gains, is
engulfing insidiously the state governments into the jaws of that
which feeds them.72
Baker v. Carr, a landmark case in this area, provided that federal re-
spect for state self protection could not act to shield the state and allow
it to invade a citizen's constitutional rights.7 : The Federal Judiciary is
required to balance individual rights versus state self protection.7 4
Against this backdrop of judicial development a definite judicial
trend in response to the social and economic demands of current Ameri-
can society has taken place. As a result of the increasing interest in in-
dividual rights NAACP v. Button75 was accepted by the Supreme Court
after considerable litigation.70 This case involved the Virginia branch
of the NAACP, a nationwide incorporated nonprofit association. The
Virginia branch was an unincorporated association, which had the basic
purpose of creating, providing and enforcing equal rights for Negroes.
The primary source of their funds was public contributions. This or-
70 Re Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N.E.2d 749 (1936).
71 American Auto Ass'n. v. Merrick, 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
72 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F.Supp. 556, 564 (D.Ct.La. 1964).
73 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
74 Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
75 NAACP v. Button, supra note 12.
76 NAACP v. Patty, 159 F.Supp. 503 (D.Ct. Va. 1958); NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va.
142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960), rev'd, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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ganization developed a unique method of obtaining cases to litigate. For
example, they would have a meeting of Negro parents who would, after
a discussion of their civil rights and any particular situations in which
they were involved, sign a form authorizing the NAACP to litigate their
civil rights. Oftentimes the litigant did not even know of his involve-
ment. The legal staff of the Virginia Conference, consisting of 15 at-
torneys, could decide whether or not to litigate, received a per diem fee
not to exceed $60 plus out-of-pocket expenses, but did not receive any
other compensation. Virginia did not attempt to actively prohibit this
activity until 1956, when it passed a law which prohibited any entity or
person from soliciting business for an attorney.77 When attempting to
enforce these statutes, the state of Virginia argued that, since they had
adopted Canons 35 and 47,78 the NAACP, a lay organization, was acting
as an intermediary in aiding attorneys, and that this constituted the un-
authorized practice of law.7 9 The NAACP contended that the Virginia
state regulations abridged the freedoms guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the legal services offered
by the NAACP were "modes of expression and association" guaranteed
by the First Amendment and rights protected from state action by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that the state of Virginia had not shown
any substantial regulatory purpose which would be abrogated by the
activities of the NAACP. A state may not prohibit this form of ex-
pression through its regulatory controls. The Court went on to point
out that orderly group activities, such as providing legal services, are
protected by the First Amendment. It should also be recognized that
the fact that the rights of a minority race were involved did not affect
the outcome of this suit, for these privileges and rights would be avail-
able to any group under constitutional protection of basic rights of ex-
pression and association."0
Prior to the NAACP v. Button decision, railway unions had been
involved in much litigation involving their referral system. For ex-
ample, in Hulse v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, the brotherhood
was found to be practicing law when it received a portion of a legal fee
from an attorney for referring a personal injury case. s ' Even though the
results of union cases have shown reduced legal rates,s 2 some attorneys
who have been participating in the legal program of the brotherhood
77 Code of Virginia, 1950, §§54-74, 54-78 and 54-70, as amended by Acts of 1956, Ex.
Sess., c. 33 (Repl. Vol. 1958); see NAACP v. Buton, supra note 12, at 423.
78 171 Va. pages xxxii-xxxiii, xxxv (1938); also see NAACP v. Button, supra note 12,
at 425.
79 Supra note 12, at 425.
80 Ibid.; see also, United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n., supra note 11.
81 Hulse v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960).
82 Cleveland Bar Ass'n. v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N.E.2d 782 (1961); cert. denied,
369 U.S. 861 (1962).
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have been suspended.8 3 Even as early as 1963 there was some anticipa-
tion that these rulings would not stand in the future, and there was a
definite tendency towards allowing unions to provide legal counsel to
their members., 4 Thus it was only natural that the important Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia8 5 decision follow close on the
heels of NAACP v. Button.
The brotherhood was founded in 1883 to protect railway employees,
after obtaining legislation for these railroadmen.8 6 They needed some
method of realizing the full benefit of these acts. Members of the
brotherhood were plagued by lack of adequate counsel, and by claim
adjusters seeking to quickly expedite their causes. To overcome this
situation, the brotherhood selected an attorney in each area of the United
States, to recommend to their members. A department of legal counsel
was organized for this purpose, making attorneys well versed in these
particular suits available to the membership, attempting to maximize
each recovery. Usually 25% of an attorney's fee was returned to the
union for investigatory services provided by the union. Here again the
Supreme Court subjugated the powers of Virginia to regulate the prac-
tice of law in the state to the First Amendment rights of free speech,
petition and assembly, through the Fourteenth Amendment, and held
that the members of the union have a right to associate in order to ad-
vise themselves of their rights and protect the associational rights of
the union members.8 7
After the Supreme Court made it eminently clear that they would
allow a union to suggest and recommend lawyers, there was much con-
jecture as to whether they would allow these unions to hire salaried at-
torneys to represent their members. From some corners the same argu-
ments were advocated, that is, that the attorney-client relationship would
be destroyed and the legal profession would be commercialized by the
union-hired attorneys.88 Others reasoned that the bar was shifting its
attitude on the point because of these two recent Supreme Court cases
and the increasing sensitivity to the importance of counsel. Since the
union would have no selfish financial interest in the outcome of a case
handled by a salaried attorney, it was reasoned that there would be no
83 Columbus Bar Ass'n. v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E.2d 728 (1963).
84 Drinker, supra note 18, at 167.
85 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
86 Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531, as amended, 45 USC §§ 1-43; Federal Employ-
er's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 46 USC §§ 51-60; see Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia, supra note 85, at 3.
87 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, supra note 85.
88 Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law-Union Program of Hiring Attorneys is un-
authorized Practice of law, 65 Mich. L. R. 805 (1967) (Note: this article was written
before the United Mine Workers of America v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217(1967).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
18 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
injustice to the public. The assumption that there would always be a
conflict of interest was unwarranted since both parties are actually
working for the best interest of the individual member.8 9
In late 1967 this question was presented before the Supreme Court.
The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Statute ." was enacted in 1912.
Litigation of claims subjected members of the United Mine Workers to
exorbitant contingency fees, sometimes amounting to 40% or 50% of
the recovery. In order to solve this problem the U.M.W. employed on a
salary basis, a licensed attorney to represent union members. Members
had the option of not using the union counsel, who was specifically in-
structed that his relations and obligations were strictly with the member
and not with the association. When the settlement was made the mem-
ber received the full amount of the settlement and the attorney re-
ceived as compensation only his salary from the union. A Virginia
Court had held that the NAACP v. Button decision was restricted to
forms of political expression and therefore was not applicable in this
instance. The Supreme Court announced that such a restriction on the
rights unjustifiably restricted the associational rights of the members,
and the possibility of baseless litigation and conflicting interest was too
remote to justify such a broad abrogation of the union member's First
Amendment rights. Therefore the First Amendment rights of speech,
assembly and petition, made effective in the state through the Four-
teenth Amendment, gives the union the right to hire salaried counsel for
use by the members of the union.9 1
The favorable attitude towards group legal services seems always
increasing. 2 Even as early as 1935 it was decided that legal aid given
in a charitable situation, with no opinion or advice, without substan-
tial income, and not as an occupation, was not practice of law. 93 But as
time progressed some argued that the divided allegiance,94 conflict of
interest, lack of fiduciary or attorney-client relationship and commerciali-
zation of the profession are strong deterrents.9a The judicial trend to a
more liberal attitude towards non-lawyers who assist others to exert
89 Note, Ethics-Unauthorized Practice of Law-Labor Unions Furnishing of a Sal-
aried Attorney for Use of Members in Prosecuting Workmen's Compensation Claims,52 Iowa L. R. 351 (1966), also see the changing attitude of the Bar in, CommitteeReport on Group Legal Services, Group Legal Services, 39 Cal. S.B.J. 639, 652, 722-28(1964).
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. c., 48, § 138.1 et seq. (1963).
91 United Mine Workers of America v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n., supra note 11.
92 McCraken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Professional Standards, 37 Va.
L. R. 399 (1951); Drinker, Legal Ethics 165-167 (1953); Hildebrand v. State Bar ofCal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); Markus, Group Representation by Attorneys
as Misconduct, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
93 In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass. 1935).
94 A.B.A., supra note 50.
95 Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing theServices of Attorneys, 72 Harv. L. R. 1334 (1959).
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their legal rights, while receiving no compensation, 0 indicates the need
for socialized legal services for the poor, so that now a charitable cor-
poration may give legal advice to indigents.9 7 This changing attitude has
been attributed to the rise in modern commerce (in the area of trade
and travel) and the growth of modern science.0 8 Members of the legal
profession should begin to consider more methods of supplying legal
services to those who need them. Group service is a possible solution. 9
This shifting attitude is applying increasing pressure on the legal pro-
fession to decrease the cost of legal service. Legal insurance, referral
services and bank financing are possible solutions that have been sug-
gested. The Group Legal Service seems to be one possible solution for
individual members of the public.' 00
Since legal services are "modes of expression and association" which
may be offered by a corporation to its individual members, may these
same services be offered to corporate members? The translation of this
attitude and constitutional interpretation into the situation of legal serv-
ices offered to corporate members by a trade association indicates a
permissive trend. However, before becoming involved in this type of
program each party must make an in-depth evaluation.
Would the association wish to subject its assets to liability for un-
ethical acts? Is such a legal service operable when the association can-
not exert control over the attorney? Would there be any antitrust im-
plications involved in their legal service system? Could the association
allow a natural attorney-client relationship to exist without acting as an
intermediary? Could they resist the temptation to make a profit from
such a system?
Corporate members must determine the possibilities and ramifi-
cations of the conflict of interest problem. Would technical and busi-
ness knowledge of their particular industry actually be helpful in the
solution of their legal problems? If the association was unincorporated,
or did not properly shield them from liability, would the corporate
member be willing to subject its assets to liability for the unethical acts
of an association attorney?
Each prospective attorney must also analyze the conflict of interest
problem. He should be aware of the lack of independence he would
now have, which might be offset by occupational security. The attorney
must also resolve personal ethical questions involved in such an ar-
96 Hackin v. Arizona, 88 S.Ct. 325 (1967) (see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas).
97 Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 417 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
98 Cohen, The Legal Conscience 21 (1960).
99 Note, Group Legal Services, 79 Harv. L. R. 416 (1965).
100 Helping Mr. Average, The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 6, 1968).
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rangement. Will he be able to maintain a proper attorney-client rela-
tionship? Would he accept separate compensation from others?
The answers to these questions are dependent upon the particular
parties involved. Their answers, attitudes and "personalities" eventually
will determine the operational feasibility and practicability of all legal
services offered by a trade association.
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